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Abstract—Cloud computing has been a dominant paradigm for a variety of information processing platforms, particularly for enabling
various popular applications of sharing economy. However, there is a major concern regarding data privacy on these cloud-based
platforms. This work presents novel cloud-based privacy-preserving solutions to support collaborative consumption applications for
sharing economy. In typical collaborative consumption, information processing platforms need to enable fair cost-sharing among
multiple users for utilizing certain shared facilities and communal services. Our cloud-based privacy-preserving protocols, based on
homomorphic Paillier cryptosystems, can ensure that the cloud-based operator can only obtain an aggregate schedule of all users in
facility sharing, or a service schedule conforming to service provision rule in communal service sharing, but is unable to track the
personal schedules or demands of individual users. More importantly, the participating users are still able to settle cost-sharing among
themselves in a fair manner for the incurred costs, without knowing each other’s private schedules or demands. Our privacy-preserving
protocols involve no other third party who may compromise privacy. We also provide an extensive evaluation study and a
proof-of-concept system prototype of our protocols.
Index Terms—Cloud-based Privacy-Preserving, Collaborative Consumption, Sharing Economy, Homomorphic Cryptosystems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing has been used as a dominantparadigm of computing systems for a variety of in-
formation processing platforms. A typical information pro-
cessing platform requires users to submit their personal
data, which will be processed and synthesized in central-
ized cloud-based systems. This paradigm underlies many e-
commerce, social network and work productivity platforms.
In particular, cloud-based platforms are used to support the
emerging paradigm of “sharing economy”, which aims to
facilitate cost-sharing among end-users and promote effi-
cient utilization of shared resources. Among the various
applications in sharing economy, collaborative consumption
is one of the major classes that enable the shared use of
facilities or services by a group of users for reducing the
cost of otherwise exclusive consumption.
In collaborative consumption applications, there are cer-
tain shared facilities, resources and communal services that
users can request and book in a dynamic fashion through
some cloud-based platforms, which coordinate the utiliza-
tion and cost-sharing among the involved users. For ex-
ample, occupants can reserve personal resources (e.g., hot
desks and dormitory beds) and share the cost of com-
munal facilities and amenities (e.g., utilities, air condition-
ing, kitchens, bathrooms, gyms). Another example is about
sharing communal services, such as transportation shuttles,
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garbage collection and postal services. These communal
services are usually operated according to fixed schedules.
To improve efficiency, these communal services should be
operated according to user-initiated demands. Users should
be able to submit their demands and schedule the services
accordingly. At the end, the incurred cost will be shared
among the participants who request the facilities or services.
However, there is a heightened concern in data pri-
vacy nowadays. Consumer watchdog organizations have
frequently voiced their concerns regarding misuse of user
data without user consents. Notably, there were many well-
known incidents of data breaches, whereby sensitive user
data was stolen by hackers or leaked to public. Further-
more, more stringent data protection and privacy laws are
being introduced worldwide. In particular, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) was introduced in Europe,
which requires strict data privacy protection measures on
the cloud-based platforms that collect user data.
This work aims to address the privacy concern aris-
ing in cloud-based applications and systems. Especially,
we present novel privacy-preserving solutions to enhance
cloud-based information processing platforms for collabo-
rative consumption applications in sharing economy. In this
paper, we consider two important aspects on cloud-based
platforms for collaborative consumption:
1) Privacy: Typical users will be deterred from sharing
the knowledge of personal usage, if this can com-
promise their privacy. We aim to ensure sufficient
user privacy in the sharing activities without leak-
ing personal data of users.
2) Fair Cost-Sharing: The associated cost of collabo-
rative consumption should be attributed fairly to
the participants. Even users are unwilling to reveal
the knowledge of personal usage, we still provide
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2Fig. 1: Illustrations of (a) privacy-preserving facility sharing and (b) privacy-preserving communal service sharing.
effective solutions to determine the fair cost-sharing
contributions of each user.
The goal of this work is to offer proper solutions that
can enable fair cost-sharing and preserve privacy in collabo-
rative consumption. Fortunately, the complete knowledge
of personal usage is not always necessary for facility or
service provision. Sometimes, only the coarse aggregate us-
age, rather than individual ones, suffices. Also, the detailed
personal usage is not necessary for fair cost-sharing. Each
user only needs to know the portion of his own usage to
compute his contribution.
1.1 Use Cases of Cloud-based Privacy-Preserving Col-
laborative Consumption
This paper presents cloud-based privacy-preserving pro-
tocols for collaborative consumption. Through a privacy-
preserving protocol, users can settle cost-sharing among
themselves without knowing each others’ usage, whereas
the facility or service operators in the cloud are only re-
vealed the minimal information of aggregate usage for
facility or service provision. Furthermore, other than users
and operators, there should be no other third party involved
in the protocols, who may compromise privacy.
In particular, we consider two general use cases of cloud-
based privacy-preserving collaborative consumption (as il-
lustrated in Fig. 1):
1) Privacy-Preserving Facility Sharing: Users are sup-
posed to share the cost of a certain facility in a
privacy-preserving manner via a cloud-based plat-
form that is managed by a facility operator. But the
facility operator does not know the individual users’
usage of the facility. More generally, even if the
operator wants to optimize space allocation, he only
needs to know the coarse occupancy (e.g., reserving
a small room for 10 persons or less, and a big room
for more than 10 persons). In Fig. 1 (a), users first
submit their personal schedules of usage. With a
proper privacy-preserving aggregation protocol, the
operator can only obtain an aggregate schedule of
binary (or coarse) occupancy status, but is unable to
track the personal usage of individual users. Users
will be provided only the number of concurrent
users in their used timeslots, but not other timeslots
that they do not use. This allows users to settle cost-
sharing payment among themselves in a privacy-
preserving manner. A time-varying access key to the
facility will be provided to the requested users, after
proper payment is received1.
2) Privacy-Preserving Communal Service Sharing:
Users request their demands of a certain commu-
nal service in a timely manner via a cloud-based
platform that is managed by a service operator. The
service operator is supposed to provide the service
when the accumulative demand exceeds a certain
threshold based on a service provision rule. For
example, in garbage collection service, a garbage
collector is supposed to carry out a collection ser-
vice to possibly multiple disposal sites, when the
total accumulative amount of garbage disposal is
sufficiently high. In Fig. 1 (b), users first submit
their personal demands. With a proper privacy-
preserving aggregation protocol, the operator can
only obtain a service schedule conforming to the
service provision rule of the accumulative demand
exceeding a threshold, but is unable to track the
personal demands of individual users. Users will be
provided the percentage of their demands of each
involved service action as a basis of service charge
settlement among themselves.
Although there are various cloud-based privacy-
preserving protocols in other applications (e.g., ride-
sharing), the novelty of our protocols is not only about
enabling privacy-preserving data aggregation, but also
privacy-preserving cost-sharing among users. Users will be
1. Privacy-preserving payments can be handled using privacy-
oriented cryptocurrencies (e.g., Monero, Dash, ZCash).
3provided information of their usage for only the respectively
used timeslots to settle cost-sharing. Otherwise, users will
be oblivious of the usage of others. This can mitigate privacy
compromise. Also, privacy-preserving payment is incorpo-
rated in the applications of collaborative consumption. In
this paper, our novel privacy-preserving solutions for col-
laborative consumption are based on homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystems.
This paper is organized as follows. We first review the
related work in Section 2. We formulate the problems in
Section 3 and present the preliminary of cryptosystems in
Section 4. The cloud-based privacy-preserving protocols are
described in Section 5, with a theoretic privacy analysis of
our protocols in Section 6. The extensions of our protocols
are provided in Section 7. We present a proof-of-concept
cloud-based prototype in Section 8 and an extensive empiri-
cal evaluation study of our protocols in Section 9. Section 10
concludes this paper.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Cloud-based Data Aggregation and Privacy
The rise of sharing economy has drawn substantial at-
tention to proper design of its mechanisms. The previous
studies mainly focus on the aspects of game-theoretical
and big data analyses [1]. However, the privacy aspect
on the related information processing platforms has been
studied to a less extent. Recently, there are several studies
about privacy-preserving ride-sharing [2], [3]. These studies
aim to preserve the private locations of riders and drivers
in matching. However, the extant privacy-preserving ride-
sharing literature does not consider cost-sharing among
riders and drivers, and hence does not address privacy-
preserving cost-sharing.
As a departure from the prior literature, this work is
the first study to address privacy-preserving collaborative
consumption and cost-sharing on a cloud-based platform.
In a broad sense, privacy-preserving collaborative consump-
tion involves privacy-preserving data aggregation. Gener-
ally speaking, this line of work shares the common goal of
learning an aggregation result from the data collected from
a set of users without revealing individual users’ private
data. So far, a large body of work on privacy-preserving
data aggregation (e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]) has been proposed
in the literature. However, combining privacy-preserving
data aggregation and privacy-preserving cost sharing has
not been investigated in the prior work.
Another relevant work of cloud-based privacy-
preserving data aggregation is privacy-preserving meeting
scheduling [9], where privacy-preserving protocols were
proposed by taking advantage of the homomorphic prop-
erties of well-known cryptosystems to privately and effi-
ciently compute common availabilities among users. How-
ever, their meeting scheduling problem is different from our
problems, and they did not consider cost-sharing.
To summarize, the previous work has not addressed
cloud-based privacy-preserving collaborative consumption.
Our study is the first work to integrate cloud-based privacy-
preserving data aggregation and privacy-preserving cost-
sharing. Also, the prior work of cloud-based privacy-
preserving data aggregation mostly considers exact data
aggregation, whereas our protocols also support coarse data
aggregation (e.g., coarse occupancy) to mask the true aggre-
gate data by an estimation function.
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Techniques and Systems
We also briefly review privacy-preserving techniques, such
as differential privacy, secure multi-party computation and
homomorphic encryption.
1) Differential privacy: Dwork et.al. [10] first proposed
the notion of differential privacy (DP) for the sin-
gle database scenario, where a trusted database
server answers queries in a privacy-preserving man-
ner with tailored randomization to the response to
the query [10]. In the absence of a trusted aggregator
(e.g., cloud applications), users need to perturb their
data before submission to the aggregator. Without
the combination of cryptographic techniques and
distributed data randomization, each user has to
add large enough noise to guarantee local differ-
ential privacy [4]. Compared with cryptographic
techniques, differential privacy always comes with
a trade-off between privacy and accuracy, hence not
suitable for privacy-preserving cost-sharing.
2) Secure multi-party computation (MPC): The problem
of computing a multi-party sum where no party
reveals its value in the clear, even to the aggregator,
is referred to as Secure Aggregation [11]. However,
most MPC constructions are interactive. Therefore,
directly employing MPC in our setting would re-
quire users to interact with each other whenever
a coarse aggregate statistic needs to be computed.
Such an interaction model may not be desirable in
practical settings, especially in a client-server com-
putation model as often seen in cloud computing
applications [12], [13].
3) Homomorphic encryption: Fully homomorphic cryp-
tosystems can support general computation on ci-
phertexts but less efficient which result in a solution
that is impractical [14]. On the other hand, par-
tially homomorphic encryption is less costly, such
as Paillier [15]. Most previous work on homomor-
phic encryption considers homomorphic operations
on ciphertexts encrypted under the same key [14],
[16]. These schemes do not directly apply in our
problems, since if users encrypted their data under
the aggregator’s public key, the aggregator would
not only be able to decrypt the aggregate statistics,
but also users’ private data. Therefore, similar to [9],
we rely on homomorphic properties of asymmetric
cryptosystems to prevent the operator from gain-
ing any knowledge about the privacy of individual
users.
In terms of privacy-preserving system architecture, there
are distributed or centralized designs. Distributed design
relies on equal computation from its participants. However,
distributed design requires frequent and intensive message
exchanges among participants, presenting limitations in
scalability and complexity for a large number of (resource-
limited) mobile devices. Two additional drawbacks are the
4need of sequencing among participants and the unpre-
dictability of results (e.g., if a participant interrupts the
protocol). On the other hand, centralized cloud-based de-
sign [9], [17] is better in terms of scalability, communication
cost, and resilience. Therefore, we draw on the centralized
design but also carefully address the privacy issues using
homomorphic encryption.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section formulates the general problems of privacy-
preserving collaborative consumption.
3.1 General Problem Setup
There are two parties in our problems: (1) an operator
managing a cloud-based platform, and (2) a group of N
users, denoted by i ∈ {1...N}, who are sharing a certain
resource or service via the cloud-based platform.
In general, there are some common properties in the
privacy-preserving literature:
1) Honest-but-curious Model: We assume the honest-but-
curious (or semi-honest) model, where the operator
and users always obey the protocol instructions
by disclosing truthful information, but they may
attempt to explicitly or implicitly infer the private
information of others based on the intermediate
results obtained during the execution of the proto-
col. This model follows a practical setting, because
the operator always has incentive for business with
customers and the users have the genuine needs for
resources or services from the operator. It is the pri-
mary interest of everyone to allow the business pro-
ceeds as intended, and there are little incentives for
them to behave maliciously. However, the personal
data may be leaked intentionally or unintentionally
from the operator or a user to a third party (e.g.,
data selling, or data breach). We also assume that all
users have no-zero usage or demand.
2) No Collusion: We assume that there is no collusion
among these semi-honest users. This is a realistic as-
sumption, because collusion will involve disclosing
personal information to others, which will defeat the
purpose of privacy.
3) Privacy with Cloud-based Operator: The cloud-based
operator is expected to be given the minimal in-
formation for their operations and services, such
as a coarse aggregate schedule of usage, or a ser-
vice schedule confirming the service provision rule.
However, the personal data of users, such as per-
sonal usage, should not be revealed or inferred from
the protocol by the operator.
4) Privacy with Other Users: Each user is expected to be
given the portion of his own usage in the incurred
resources or services. This allows a user to deter-
mine his contribution of cost-sharing. However, the
personal data of other users, such as personal usage,
should not be revealed or inferred from the protocol
by the user.
Next, we formally define three collaborative consump-
tion problems: uncapacitated facility sharing (UFS), capaci-
tated facility sharing (CFS), and communal service sharing
TABLE 1: Key Symbols and Notations.
Symbol Definition
UFS Uncapacitated Facility Sharing problem
CFS Capacitated Facility Sharing problem
CSS Communal Service Sharing problem
N Total number of users
i The i-th user
m Total number of timeslots
bji Requested facility usage of user i at the j-th timeslot in
UFS/CFS
Nj Total number of requested users at the j-th timeslot in
UFS/CFS
pji Requested demand of user i at the j-th timeslot in CSS
qki Fraction of requested demand of user i in the k-th service
action in CSS
sk Timeslot of the k-th service action in CSS
(CSS). For clarity, we first provide the problems’ defini-
tions without considering privacy-preserving protocols. In
Section 5, we will provide privacy-preserving protocols to
solve these problems using homomorphic cryptosystem (to
be explained in Section 4). Also, Table 1 lists key symbols
and notations in the problem formulations.
3.2 Uncapacitated Facility Sharing (UFS)
We first define the Uncapacitated Facility Sharing (UFS)
problem, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 (a). In this problem,
the users share a certain facility, and the operator only needs
to know whether the facility will be used by any users at a
specific timeslot (coarse aggregate), without considering the
actual capacity, i.e., total number of requested users at the
timeslot (exact aggregate). In UFS, each user i has a private
usage schedule of using a certain facility over discrete
timeslots, denoted by a sequence of bits bi = [b1i , ..., b
m
i ].
Each bit bji ∈ {0, 1} represents the usage request of user i at
the j-th timeslot, where bji = 1 means that user i requests
usage of the facility at the j-th timeslot, whereas bji = 0
means that the user does not request usage at the timeslot.
Note that the number of timeslotsm is constant for all users.
The users are supposed to provide the operator with
(bi)
N
i=1 in a privacy-preserving manner (without revealing
the individual schedule bi of each i). In return, each user i
is given ai = [a1i , ..., a
m
i ], where
aji ,
{
Nj , if b
j
i = 1
?, if bji = 0
(1)
where Nj =
∑N
i=1 b
j
i is the number of requested users at the
j-th timeslot. Namely, if i requests usage at the j-th timeslot,
then i is given the total number of requested users at the
timeslot. Otherwise, i is unable to infer the information of
the number of requested users at the j-th timeslot. The users
who request usage will split the associated cost based on the
number of requested users at each timeslot.
The operator will only be able to derive the coarse
aggregate schedule of usage c = [c1, ..., cm], where cj = 1
means that there exists at least user iwith bji = 1, and c
j = 0
otherwise. Namely,
cj ,
N∨
i=1
bji (2)
where ∨ is the binary disjunction operator.
53.3 Capacitated Facility Sharing (CFS)
We next define the Capacitated Facility Sharing (CFS) prob-
lem, where the operator also needs to estimate the number
of requested users of each timeslot coarsely for the purpose
of capacity allocation. For example, a building operator will
reserve a small room if the number of users is less than 10,
or a larger room otherwise. Consider a sequence (C1, ..., Cr)
such that 0 < C1 < ... < Cr ≤ N . Each Cr represents of the
capacity of the r-th facility. For convenience, we let C0 = 0.
We define an estimation function f(·) ∈ {0, ..., r} by:
f(x) = r, if Cr−1 < x ≤ Cr (3)
Estimation function f(·) maps the total number of users x to
the required facility r that can provide the minimal sufficient
capacity. f(·) can mask x, without revealing the true number
of users.
In CFS, the users are supposed to provide the operator
with (bi)Ni=1 in a privacy-preserving manner. In return, each
user i is given ai (same as that of UFS). But the operator
will only be able to derive a schedule of required facilities
c˜ = [c˜1, ..., c˜m], where
c˜j , f
( N∑
i=1
bji
)
= f(N j). (4)
Note that UFS is a sub-problem of CFS by setting C1 = N .
Remarks: UFS and CFS can capture different degrees of
privacy with cloud-based operators. In UFS, the operator
does not know the number of occupants in each timeslot,
but only the status of being occupied or not, whereas CFS
allows the operator know only coarse occupant number,
specified by the thresholds of capacities. We note that CFS
can allow arbitrary levels of coarse occupant number, which
makes our protocol flexible to capture any degree of privacy
requirement with the operator.
3.4 Communal Service Sharing (CSS)
Finally, we define the Communal Service Sharing (CSS)
problem, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 (b). In this prob-
lem, each user has a schedule of personal demands of a
service over discrete timeslots, denoted by a sequence of
real numbers pi = [p1i , ..., p
m
i ], where p
j
i represents the
requested demand of user i at the j-th timeslot. The users
are supposed to provide the operator with (pi)Ni=1 in a
privacy-preserving manner. The operator will be able to
derive a schedule of service actions. Each service action
is determined by a simple service provision rule – if the
accumulative demand from all users since the last service
action exceeds a threshold C , then a new service action
is required. Formally, we denote the schedule of service
actions by s = [s1, ..., sk, ...], where sk is the timeslot of
the k-th service action that is defined by:
sk , min
{
t | t ≥ sk−1 + 1 and
N∑
i=1
t∑
j=sk−1+1
pji ≥ C
}
.
(5)
For example, pi represents the amount of garbage disposal
from user i over time. A garbage service operator will
dispatch a garbage collection service when the total amount
of garbage disposal from all users is sufficiently large by
exceeding C .
In return, each user i is given qi = [q1i , ..., q
k
i , ...], where
qki ,

∑sk
j=sk−1+1 p
j
i∑N
i′=1
∑sk
j=sk−1+1 p
j
i′
, if
∑sk
j=sk−1+1 p
j
i > 0
0, otherwise
(6)
Namely, if i has non-zero demand in the k-th service action,
then i is given qki , the fraction of his demand in that service
action. The users will split the associated cost based on the
portions of their demands in all service actions.
Remarks: All UFS, CFS and CSS problems share similar
structures of usage data aggregation at the operator and
cost-sharing among users. UFS is the most basic one. CFS
extends UFS by considering facility capacity, whereas CSS
extends UFS by considering service action scheduling.
4 PRELIMINARY OF CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Our privacy-preserving solutions rely on several standard
tools from cryptosystems (e.g., Paillier cryptosystem). We
briefly explain these tools in this section. More detailed
explanations can be found in standard cyber security and
cryptosystem textbooks (e.g., [18]).
4.1 Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems
Many cryptosystems use some forms of asymmetric key
cryptosystems. We assume that the users share a common
secret, which is used to derive a common key pair (KP ,Ks),
where Kp is the public key and Ks is the private key.
This can be accomplished, for example, through a secure
credential establishment protocol ( [19], [20]). The private
key is derived and known to each user but not to the
operator. We write the encryption of a message x with the
group public key by EKP ,r[x] = y, where r is a randomly
chosen integer (that does not affect the decryption), and the
decryption of the encrypted message y by DKs [y] = x.
4.2 Homomorphic and Paillier Cryptosystems
Homomorphic cryptosystems allow computational opera-
tions on encrypted data, with results that match those of
the operations as if they had been performed on unen-
crypted data (plaintext). Homomorphic cryptosystems are
often used for privacy-preserving computation. This allows
data to be encrypted and out-sourced for third-party com-
putation (e.g., cloud-based platforms) without revealing the
true data.
Paillier cryptosystem [18] is a realization of partially
homomorphic cryptosystem, which satisfies the following
homomorphic properties:
DKs
[
EKp,r1 [m1]∗EKp,r2 [m2] (mod n2)
]
= m1+m2 (mod n)
(7)
DKs
[
(EKp,r1 [m1])
m2 (mod n2)
]
= m1 ·m2 (mod n) (8)
Kp and Ks are respectively the public and private keys. n is
generated by n = p·q where p and q are random large prime
numbers. m is the plaintext to be encrypted. r1, r2 ∈ N are
any randomly chosen positive integers, which will not affect
the outcomes of decryption. For brevity, we will suppress
the (mod) terms in the equations of this paper.
64.3 Paillier Cryptosystem with Negative and Non-
Integer Numbers
In the original Paillier cryptosystem, the value space is
ZN = {0, 1, · · · ,N−1}. To handle negative numbers and real
numbers, we follow the approach in [21]. Since the homo-
morphic property of Paillier cryptosystem is over modulo
arithmetic, we can shift the negative numbers to the interval
of {N−12 + 1, ...,N − 1}, such that we set −1 = N − 1 mod
N, while keeping non-negative numbers in the interval of
{0, 1, ..., N−12 }. When the decrypted value yi > N2 , we shift
yi back by yi − N. This can limit the input values to the
interval of (−N2 , N−12 ]. We set N to have 1024 bits to be
sufficiently large for accommodating all the computations
in our protocols.
For real number y ∈ Rn (or yi ∈ R), we can use Scaling,
Rounding, Unscaling (SRU) mechanism [21], [22]. Let S
be the scaling factor, where S should be large enough to
eliminate rounding errors. Then we can approximate the
value of yi ∈ R by y¯i = bS · yic ∈ ZN. Here we use y¯i
to denote the rounded off integer of yi. We will use similar
notations for other variables in this paper. The approximate
value of yi can be recovered by dividing S (i.e.,
yi
S ). Note
that this may result in an inaccuracy problem. To ensure
acceptable rounding errors, the scaling factor should be
properly chosen considering the specific application context.
4.4 Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
To improve the key distribution in Paillier cryptosystem, it
is possible that the users do not need to share a common
private key. A variant of Paillier cryptosystem is called
(N, t)-threshold Paillier cryptosystem, in which the private
key Ks is divided and distributed to N users (denoted as
Ks1,Ks2, · · · ,KsN ) during the initialization stage, such that
each user only obtains a share of the private key, rather than
the complete private key. To decrypt a ciphertext, a user
needs to cooperate with at least t− 1 other users. Each user
i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) computes a partial decryption ci = c2N !Ksi
of ciphertext c = EKp(m) with his own partial private key
Ksi. At least t copies of ci will be required to decrypt c. An
(N, t)-threshold Paillier cryptosystem has been proposed in
[23].
5 CLOUD-BASED PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTO-
COLS
In this section, we present cloud-based privacy-preserving
protocols to solve UFS, CFS and CSS problems using Paillier
cryptosystem. A theoretic privacy analysis of our protocols
is given in Section 6.
5.1 Privacy-Preserving Uncapacitated Facility Sharing
(PP-UFS)
First, we present a privacy-preserving protocol to ensure
privacy in uncapacitated facility sharing. Our protocol is
called Privacy-Preserving Uncapacitated Facility Sharing
(PP-UFS) protocol, which is consisted of four stages as
follows:
5.1.1 Stage 0: Initialization
In the initialization stage, the users derive a common key
pair (KP ,Ks), through a secure credential establishment
protocol. The common key pair (KP ,Ks) will be used in
Paillier cryptosystem. Each user i also generates a random
number rji for each timeslot j for encryption in Paillier
cryptosystem.
In the protocol, most encryption and decryption oper-
ations are carried out by the users. But the operator also
needs to encrypt a random integer Rj for each timeslot j,
without revealing it to the users. Thus, the operator is given
the public key KP – but not the private key Ks, so cannot
decrypt any encrypted messages.
5.1.2 Stage 1: Distribution to Users
In this stage, the users provides their personal schedules
(bi)
N
i=1 in a privacy-preserving manner. If user i requests
usage at the j-th timeslot (i.e., bji = 1), then i is given N
j
(the number of requested users at the timeslot). See Fig. 2
for an illustration of this stage.
The steps of this stage are executed as follows:
1) Each user i first encrypts bji and sends EKp,rji [b
j
i ] to
the operator for each timeslot j.
2) The operator multiplies all the received encrypted
value (EKp,rji [b
j
i ])
N
i=1 as
∏N
i′=1 EKp,rji′
[bji′ ] with an
encrypted random integer EKp,r[Rj ] (obtained in
Stage 0). The operator also takes each EKp,rji [b
j
i ]
to the power of −Rj , and returns the following
product to each user i for each timeslot j:
( N∏
i′=1
EKp,rji′
[bji′ ]
) ∗ EKp,r[Rj ] ∗ EKp,rji [bji ]−Rj (9)
3) Each user i receives and decrypts the following
value for each timeslot j:
DKs
[( N∏
i′=1
EKp,rji′
[bji′ ]
) ∗ EKp,r[Rj ] ∗ EKp,rji [bji ]−Rj]
= DKs
[
EKp,rji [
N∑
i=1
bji +R
j −Rj · bji ]
]
=
 DKs
[
EKp,rji [
∑N
i=1 b
j
i ]
]
, if bji = 1
DKs
[
EKp,rji [
∑N
i=1 b
j
i +R
j ]
]
, if bji = 0
which follows the homomorphic addition prop-
erty (Eqn. (7)) and the homomorphic multiplica-
tion property (Eqn. (8)) of Paillier cryptosystem. If
bji = 1, then i decrypts as follows:
DKs
[
EKp,rji [
N∑
i=1
bji ]
]
=
N∑
i=1
bji = N
j (10)
Otherwise, if bji = 0, then i can only obtain N
j+Rj ,
which is not useful because of the unknown random
integer Rj .
7Fig. 2: An illustration of PP-UFS Stages 1 and 2.
5.1.3 Stage 2: Aggregation at Operator
In this stage, the operator derives the coarse aggregate
schedule of usage c = [c1, ..., cm], where cj = 1 means there
exists at least one user i with bji = 1, and c
j = 0 otherwise.
See Fig. 2 for an illustration of this stage. The steps of this
stage are executed as follows:
1) The operator first generates a random integer Rji
for each user i and timeslot j. The operator sends
(Rji )
m
j=1 to user i.
2) Recall N j ,
∑N
i=1 b
j
i . If b
j
i = 1, then i knows
N j from Stage 1. Hence, i encrypts and sends the
following value to the operator for each timeslot j:
Eji ,
 EKp,rji
[
1
Nj +R
j
i
]
, if bji = 1
EKp,rji
[
Rji
]
, if bji = 0
(11)
3) The operator returns
∏N
i=1E
j
i to all users for each
timeslot j.
4) Each user i receives and decrypts the same value
(
∏N
i=1E
j
i ) as D
j , DKs
[∏N
i=1E
j
i
]
. There are two
cases:
(i) If bji = 1 for at least one user i, then D
j =
1 +
∑N
i=1R
j
i .
(ii) If bji = 0 for every user i, then D
j =∑N
i=1R
j
i .
This follows the homomorphic addition property of
Paillier cryptosystem (Eqn. (7)). Note that the users
with bji = 0 cannot determine which of the above
cases is true, because of the unknown random sum∑N
i=1R
j
i .
5) All users return the same decrypted value Dj to the
operator. Because the operator knows
∑N
i=1R
j
i , he
can determine the following cases:
(i) If Dj −∑Ni=1Rji = 1, then the j-th timeslot
is used by at least one user.
(ii) If Dj −∑Ni=1Rji = 0, then the j-th timeslot
is used by none of users.
Hence, the operator sets cj = Dj −∑Ni=1Rji .
5.1.4 Stage 3: Cost-sharing and Payment
In the final stage, the users will pay the usage fee to the
operator. The operator should publish the usage fee rate for
each timeslot in advance. Each user who uses a particular
timeslot has known N j , the number of requested users at
the timeslot (from Stage 1). They will pay the usage fee
proportionally to 1Nj . Note that payments to the operator
can be attained in a privacy-preserving manner by privacy-
oriented cryptocurrencies (e.g., Monero, Dash, ZCash).
The operator will not grant facility access to the users,
unless the required amount of usage fee has been fully
collected. Since the users are semi-honest, they will pay the
associated fees in order to gain the access. Note that the
facility access can be implemented as a form of secret keys
that can unlock the facility (e.g., using smart locks)2.
The secret keys can be distributed to the users in a
privacy-preserving manner as follows. Suppose a secret key
is represented by κj . The operator sends EKp,rji [b
j
i ]
κj to each
user i. Hence, only the users with bji = 1 (that has been
submitted in Stage 1) can decrypt the secret key for facility
access:
DKs
[
EKp,rji [b
j
i ]
κj
]
= DKs
[
EKp,rji [b
j
i · κj ]
]
= κj . (12)
5.2 Privacy-Preserving Capacitated Facility Sharing
(PP-CFS)
Next, we present a privacy-preserving protocol for capaci-
tated facility sharing, called Privacy-Preserving Capacitated
Facility Sharing (PP-CFS) protocol, which is a generalization
of PP-UFS. PP-CFS is consisted of four stages as follows:
5.2.1 Stage 0: Initialization
This stage is the same as Stage 0 in PP-UFS.
5.2.2 Stage 1: Distribution to Users
This stage is the same as Stage 1 in PP-UFS.
2. Note that the secret keys do not need to be physically entered
by the users. The secret keys can be downloaded to smartphones or
RFID cards, which can communicate automatically and wirelessly to
the smart locks.
85.2.3 Stage 2: Aggregation at Operator
This stage is similar to Stage 2 in PP-UFS with slight
modifications. In this stage, the operator derives a schedule
of required facilities c˜ = [c˜1, ..., c˜m], where c˜j = f(N j).
The steps of this stage are executed as follows:
1) The operator first generates a random integer Rji
for each user i and timeslot j. The operator sends
(Rji )
m
j=1 to user i.
2) Each user i encrypts and sends the following value
to the operator for each timeslot j:
Eˆji ,
 EKp,rji
[
f(Nj)
Nj +R
j
i
]
, if bji = 1
EKp,rji
[
Rji
]
, if bji = 0
(13)
3) The operator returns
∏N
i=1 Eˆ
j
i to all users for each
timeslot j.
4) Each user i receives and decrypts the same value as
Dˆj , DKs
[∏N
i=1 Eˆ
j
i
]
.
There are two cases of Dˆj :
(i) If bji = 1 for at least one user i, then Dˆ
j =
f(N j) +
∑N
i=1R
j
i .
(ii) If bji = 0 for every user i, then Dˆ
j =∑N
i=1R
j
i .
This follows the homomorphic addition property of
Paillier cryptosystem (Eqn. (7)).
Note that the users with bji = 0 still cannot de-
termine the value of f(N j), due to the unknown
random sum
∑N
i=1R
j
i .
5) All users return the same decrypted value Dˆj to the
operator. Because the operator knows
∑N
i=1R
j
i , he
can determine the following cases:
(i) If Dˆj − ∑Ni=1Rji = f(N j), then the j-th
timeslot is used by at least one user.
(ii) If Dˆj −∑Ni=1Rji = 0, then the j-th timeslot
is used by none of users.
Hence, the operator sets c˜j = Dˆj −∑Ni=1Rji .
5.2.4 Stage 3: Cost-sharing and Payment
This stage is similar to Stage 3 in PP-UFS. However,
the operator sets the usage fee rate proportional to f(N j).
The users requesting usage at the respective timeslot have
known N j , and then can determine the proper usage fee
rate and the corresponding payments.
5.3 Privacy-Preserving Communal Service Sharing
(PP-CSS)
Lastly, we present a privacy-preserving protocol for com-
munal service sharing, called Privacy-Preserving Commu-
nal Service Sharing (PP-CSS) protocol with four stages as
follows:
5.3.1 Stage 0: Initialization
This stage is the same as Stage 0 in PP-UFS.
5.3.2 Stage 1: Aggregation at Operator
Unlike PP-UFS, in the first stage, the operator derives a
schedule of service actions s = [s1, ..., sk, ...], where sk is
the timeslot of the k-th service action when the accumula-
tive demand from all users since the last service action at
timeslot sk−1 exceeds threshold C .
Suppose sk−1 is known for some k. Otherwise, we start
with s0 = 0. The steps of this stage are executed as follows:
(0) Let l = sk−1 and t = l + 1.
1) Each user i encrypts and sends the following value
to the operator:
E
(l,t)
i , EKp,rki
[ t∑
t′=l+1
pt
′
i −
C
N
]
(14)
2) The operator generates a random positive number
Rt and returns the product
∏N
i=1(E
(l,t)
i )
Rt to all
users.
3) Each user i receives and decrypts the same value
(
∏N
i=1(E
(l,t)
i )
Rt ) as:
Dt , DKs
[ N∏
i=1
(E
(l,t)
i )
Rt
]
= Rt · (
N∑
i=1
t∑
t′=l+1
pt
′
i − C)
(15)
which follows the homomorphic addition property
of Paillier cryptosystem (Eqn. (7)). Note that no
user can determine the value of
∑N
i=1
∑t
t′=l+1 p
t′
i
because of unknown random number Rt. However,
they can determine if Dt is positive or negative. All
users send the indicator variable 1(Dt ≥ 0) to the
operator.
4) The operator receives 1(Dt ≥ 0). There are two
cases:
(i) If Dt ≥ 0, then set the timeslot of the next
service action by sk = t. Next, set k ← k+ 1,
go to Step (0) and repeat until t > m.
(ii) If Dt < 0, then set t ← t + 1, go to Step (1)
and repeat until t > m.
5) The operator obtains a schedule of service actions
[s1, ..., sk, ...].
5.3.3 Stage 2: Distribution to Users
Let the total demand of user i in the k-the service action
be P ki ,
∑sk
j=sk−1+1 p
j
i . In the second stage, each user i
derives qi = [q1i , ..., q
k
i , ...], where q
k
i =
Pki∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′
. This stage
is a generalization of Stage 1 in PP-UFS, because P ki can be
fractional, instead of binary.
1) Each user i first encrypts P ki and sends EKp,rki [P
k
i ]
to the operator for the k-th service action.
2) The operator multiplies all the received encrypted
value (EKp,rki′ [P
k
i′ ])
N
i′=1 as
∏N
i′=1 EKp,rki′ [P
k
i′ ] with an
9encrypted random integer EKp,r[Rk] (obtained in
Stage 0), and returns the following product to each
user i for each service action k:( N∏
i′=1
EKp,rki′ [P
k
i′ ]
) ∗ EKp,r[Rk] (16)
3) Each user i computes and sends the following prod-
uct to the operator for each service action k:(( N∏
i′=1
EKp,rki′ [P
k
i′ ]
)∗EKp,r[Rk])Pki ∗EKp,rki [0] (17)
Note that the operator cannot infer P ki because
EKp,rki [0] is encrypted using an unknown random
number rki and the operator does not have the
private key.
4) The operator returns the following product to each
user i for each service action k:(( N∏
i′=1
EKp,rki′ [P
k
i′ ]
) ∗ EKp,r[Rk])Pki ∗
EKp,rki [0] ∗ EKp,rki [P
k
i ]
−Rk (18)
5) Each user i receives and decrypts the following
value for each service action k:
DKs
[(( N∏
i′=1
EKp,rki′ [P
k
i′ ]
) ∗ EKp,r[Rk])Pki ∗
EKp,rki [0] ∗ EKp,rki [P
k
i ]
−Rk
]
(19)
= DKs
[
EKp,rki [P
k
i · (
N∑
i′=1
P ki′ +R
k)]∗
EKp,rki [0] ∗ EKp,rki [−R
k · P ki ]
]
(20)
=

DKs
[
EKp,rki [P
k
i · (
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ )]
]
= P ki ·
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ , if P
k
i > 0
DKs
[
EKp,rki [0]
]
= 0, if P ki = 0
(21)
which follows the homomorphic addition prop-
erty (Eqn. (7)) and the homomorphic multiplica-
tion property (Eqn. (8)) of Paillier cryptosystem. If
P ki > 0, then i divides P
k
i ·
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ by P
k
i to obtain∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ and q
k
i =
Pki∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′
.
5.3.4 Stage 3: Cost-sharing and Payment
This stage is similar to Stage 3 in PP-UFS. But each user
i pays a service fee that is proportional to qki for the k-th
service action. Each user i requesting demand in the k-th
service action has been aware of qki and can determine his
proportion of service fee accordingly.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a security analysis of PP-UFS,
PP-CFS and PP-CSS. We show that all protocols can ensure
privacy with the operator and other users.
Theorem 1. Given the semi-honest and no-collusion adversary
assumption and the privacy of the homomorphic cryptosystem,
our PP-UFS protocol ensures that (i) the operator learns nothing
except whether the facility will be used by any users at a timeslot j,
and (ii) a user i learns nothing other than the number of requested
users at the timeslot j when i has bi = 1 or learns nothing when
bi = 0.
Security analysis of PP-UFS. We are going to split our
analysis into two cases: the case where a user say i is
corrupted and the case where the operator is corrupted.
Intuitively, we want to show a corrupted party cannot learn
any unexpected information from its view, i.e., the transcript
of messages obtained from the protocol execution [24]. Note
that as the third stage of the protocol is simply based on
the secure computation result from the first two stages for
settling payment, our security analysis just needs to be
focused on the first two stage.
We first analyze the privacy against a corrupted user i.
In Stage 1, the view of a user i is
∑N
i=1 b
j
i +R
j −Rj · bji . If i
has bji = 1, then i only obtains the aggregate usage
∑N
i=1 b
j
i
at timeslot j, which is allowed by definition. Otherwise,
i only obtains a randomly masked aggregate schedule,
i.e.,
∑N
i=1 b
j
i + R
j , which is indistinguishable from random
values, so i learns no information. In Stage 2, the view of
a user i is Rji and 1 +
∑N
i=1R
j
i or
∑N
i=1R
j
i . These are
all values which are indistinguishable from random values,
so each user i learns no information from the view. Based
on the composition theorem [25], we can have the privacy
guarantees that a user i learns no more than the number of
requested users at the timeslot j when i has bi = 1 or learns
nothing when bi = 0.
We now analyze the privacy against the operator. In
Stage 1, the view of the operator is EKp,rji [b
j
i ]. In Stage
2, the view of the operator is Eji , and 1 +
∑N
i=1R
j
i or∑N
i=1R
j
i , equivalent to 1 (resp. 1 +
∑N
i=1R
j
i ) or 0 (resp.∑N
i=1R
j
i ) as the operator knows
∑N
i=1R
j
i . Therefore, except
the allowed-by-definition result about whether a facility
will be used by any users at timeslot i, the operator only
observes entirely ciphertexts which are protected by seman-
tically secure homomorphic cryptosystem. The privacy of
homomorphic cryptosystem ensures that the operator learns
no information from these ciphertexts. Based on the compo-
sition theorem [25], we can have the privacy guarantees that
the operator learns nothing except whether the facility will
be used by any users at timeslot j.
Theorem 2. Given the semi-honest and no-collusion adversary
assumption and the privacy of the homomorphic cryptosystem,
our PP-CFS scheme ensures that (i) the operator learns nothing
except a coarse estimation of the capacity at a timeslot j, and (ii) a
user i learns nothing other than the number of requested users at
the timeslot j when i has bi = 1 or learns nothing when bi = 0.
Security analysis of PP-CFS. The security analysis is
almost the same as the analysis for the PP-UFS protocol,
so we omit the details here. Note that the PP-CFS is just
a generalization of the PP-UFS protocol, with only one
difference in that in Stage 2 of PP-CFS, each user i encrypts
f(Nj)
Nj as opposed to
1
Nj in PP-UFS, so as to allow the
operator to obtain a coarse estimation of the capacity, rather
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than a binary aggregate schedule in PP-UFS.
Theorem 3. Given the semi-honest and no-collusion adversary
assumption and the privacy of the homomorphic cryptosystem,
our PP-CSS scheme provides the following guarantees: (i) the
operator learns no information other than whether a service action
should be made; (ii) all users can learn whether the accumulated
demand exceeds the threshold without knowing. Meanwhile, a
user with zero demand learns no more information, while a user
with non-zero demand can learn the exact accumulated demand
for computing service fees.
Security analysis of PP-CSS. Similar to the analysis for
the PP-UFS scheme, we analyze the view of a user i and the
view of the operator respectively. The view of a user i in
Stage 1 is Rt · (∑Ni=1∑tt′=l+1 pt′i − C), from which a user
only learns if the accumulative demand from all users since
the last service action exceeds a threshold or not, but not
the exact accumulative demand due to the randomness Rt
introduced by the operator. The view of a user i in Stage 2
is
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ + R
k, P ki ·
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ = P
k
i (
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ + R
k) −
P ki · Rk. So, if i has P ki > 0, the view becomes
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ +
Rk and P ki ·
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ , so i can obtain
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ (through
(P ki ·
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ )/P
k
i ) and hence q
k
i , which is as expected.
If i has P ki = 0, the view becomes
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ + R
k and
0. Here,
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ + R
k is a value indistinguishable from
random value, from which i gains no information. So i with
P ki = 0 learns nothing from the view of Stage 2. Based on
the composition theorem, the privacy guarantee against the
user follows.
The view of the operator in Stage 1 is E(l,t)i and
1(Dt ≥ 0). The indicator variable 1(Dt ≥ 0) is expected
to known by the operator so that a service action can be
determined. For the ciphertext E(l,t)i , the operator learns no
information due to the semantic privacy of homomorphic
cryptosystem. Therefore, the operator learns no information
other than whether a service action needs to be sched-
uled. The view of operator in Stage 2 is EKp,rki [P
k
i ] and
EKp,rki [P
k
i · (
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′ +R
k)] ∗ EKp,rki [0]. Clearly, these are
entirely ciphertexts and the operator learns no information.
Note that here EKp,rki [0] is to prevent the case that a user has
P ki = 1 and thus the ciphertext EKp,rki [P
k
i ·(
∑N
i′=1 P
k
i′+R
k)]
returned to the operator remains unchanged, making the
operator know that P ki = 1. Based on the composition
theorem, we thus know that the operator learns nothing
except whether a service action should be made.
7 EXTENSIONS OF PROTOCOLS
7.1 Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
In this section, we extend our protocols such that the users
do not need to share a common private key in Paillier
cryptosystem. We rely on (N, t)-threshold Paillier cryp-
tosystem [23], [26].
In the (N, t)-threshold Paillier cryptosystem, the addi-
tive homomorphic property is still preserved, while the
private key is shared among N parties. The decryption of a
ciphertext requires a certain threshold number t of parties to
produce decryption shares with their decryption key share,
and these decryption shares can be combined to produce the
plaintext. We explain how user i can recover the plaintext
value underlying the ciphertext sent by the operator as
follows:
1) A set of threshold decryption keys are generated
and distributed by a trusted third party or generated
online by a specific protocol;
2) The operator randomly selects t−1 users, and sends
the ciphertext C to them for partial decryption;
3) Each selected user k produces and sends its decryp-
tion share Ck to the operator;
4) The operator sends the ciphertext C along with the
t− 1 decryption shares to the user i;
5) User i computes a decryption share using his pri-
vate key share. Then, user i combines all decryption
shares to produce the plaintext value.
7.2 User Misrepresentation Avoidance
We also discuss how to address the issue of user misrep-
resentation, whereby the users inject falsified information
in the protocols for malicious purposes, such as disrupting
the execution of the protocol or gaining private informa-
tion about other users. But note that the attack by user
misrepresentation is not able to succeed in revealing the
availabilities of other users, as the best case, a malicious user
can set its own schedule to all-available, and then guesses
the availabilities of the other N − 1 users.
For example, in PP-UFS in Section 5.1, a malicious
user may modify his schedule during the execution of the
protocol by changing the value of bji in different stages,
however, this user is anyway unable to gain the sum of
the availabilities of the other N − 1 users if his bji = 0 in
Stage 1 (1), because the randomness Rj obtained in Stage
0 cannot be canceled during the decryption in Stage 1 (3).
Thus, our privacy-preserving protocols are robust against
user misrepresentation.
Our focus is on assuring data confidentiality against the
operator. Malicious users are not our major consideration.
But more complex techniques such as zero-knowledge proof
(ZKP) can be integrated into our protocols to resist the
potential malicious users, which will be a subject of future
work.
8 CLOUD-BASED PROTOTYPE
We implemented the privacy-preserving protocols in a
proof-of-concept cloud-based prototype for hot office book-
ing. We used the [27] for the implementation of homomor-
phic Paillier cryptosystems. The cloud computing server-
side was implemented in Java 1.8.0 and the client-side was
implemented on Android 7.0 smartphones. The cloud-based
mobile app user interfaces are depicted in Fig. 3a.
In this system, users are able to set up their bookings for
a hot office between 8AM and 5PM from Monday to Satur-
day in a week. Users’ preferences will be submitted through
our privacy-preserving protocols to the hot office operator
without compromising any users’ private schedules. The
operator will perform computations on the encrypted data
and each user will be provided with the total number of
users of each timeslot that they have booked. Users’ view
mobile app interfaces show their partial payments for the
hot office at their booked timeslots or “?” for non-booked
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(a) User View. (b) Operator View.
Fig. 3: Hot office booking cloud-based mobile app system.
timeslots. Meanwhile, the interfaces also show the total
booking fee that a user needs to pay for these bookings.
The operator’s view mobile app interface is depicted in
Fig. 3b, where green tiles and red tiles respectively indicate
the occupied and vacant timeslots of the hot office. From the
interface, the operator is able to visualize the distribution
of binary occupancy status in the hot office as well as the
total expected booking fee and the booking fee that has
been received. Once the expected payments are received, the
operator can confirm the bookings by pressing “ACTIVATE”
button in order to distribute the access keys to users for their
booked timeslots.
9 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
9.1 Experimental Setup
For each user in PP-UFS, we randomly generate 48 values
of {0,1} to represent 48 timeslots over 6 days, with each day
having 8 timeslots. For each user in each timeslot in PP-CSS,
we randomly generate real values from [10,20] and set the
service threshold C = 100. To evaluate the accuracy and
sensitivity of our privacy-preserving protocols with respect
to different parameters, we use Mean Relative Error (MRE)
to measure the relative distance between the decrypted ag-
gregate schedule and the true aggregate schedule in PP-UFS,
and the decrypted aggregate demand of service and the true
aggregate demand of service in PP-CSS. We explicitly define
MRE by averaging over all the m timeslots as follows:
MRE =
∑m
t=1
m
∣∣∣D[E[∑Ni=1xti]]−∑Ni=1xti∣∣∣∑N
i=1x
t
i
(22)
where xti represents the service schedule or service demand
of user i at timeslot j.
9.2 Experimental Results
9.2.1 Accuracy and Sensitivity
For privacy-preserving facility sharing, since the encryption
and decryption operations in PP-UFS and PP-CFS are simi-
lar, here we only analyze PP-UFS for simplicity. As indicated
in Section 5.1, the only potential MRE in PP-UFS comes from
Stage2 (2) by scaling 1/N j , where N j is the total number of
requested users at timeslot j, hence positively proportional
to the number of users. By contrast, in PP-CSS, since the
requested demand of user i at timeslot j can be fractional
instead of binary, each encryption operation requires scal-
ing. Moreover, as indicated in Section 5.3, Stage1 (1) needs
to scale C/N , where N is the total number of users, hence
also positively proportional to the number of users. Below,
we investigate how MRE varies with scaling factor S when
the number of users is fixed, and how MRE varies with the
number of users when the scaling factor S is fixed.
1. MRE vs. Scaling Factor S: Scaling aims to minimize the
effect of rounding on utility. If S is chosen to be 10N , which
means consideringN digits to the right of the decimal point;
If S = 1, then the right of the decimal point is neglected, and
the scalar is rounded to the nearest integer. Since MRE is
only introduced by the scaling factor S, we vary the values
of S and measure the corresponding MRE. The experiment
is repeated for 20 times, and we report the average results.
Fig. 4a studies the impact of scaling factor S on MRE by
fixing the number of users as 20. For both PP-UFS and
PP-CSS, this figure shows that as S becomes larger, MRE
starts to gradually degrade as expected. In particular, MRE
becomes 0 when the scaling factor S ≥ 10 for PP-CSS and
S ≥ 100 for PP-UFS, which implies a higher value of S can
provide negligible utility loss.
2. MRE vs. Number of Users N : We further investigate
the impact of the number of users on MRE by varying
the number of users ranging from 4 to 20 under the fixed
scaling factor S ∈ {1, 10, 100}. As shown in Fig. 4b, when
S = 1, MRE is relatively large across different number of
users for both PP-UFS and PP-CSS, agreeing with the large
MRE with S = 1 reported in Fig. 4a. More importantly,
when S = 1, MRE generally increases with the number
of users, which would significantly compromise the utility.
The reason behind this gradual increment in MRE is rather
obvious: with the increasing number of users, N j becomes
larger and 1/N j becomes smaller, scaling factor S = 1
rounds 1/N j to the nearest integer would significantly
reduce even negate the precision. In contrast, for PP-CSS
with S ≥ 10, the values of MRE are all reduced to 0, while
PP-UFS requires S ≥ 100 to ensure the negligible values of
MRE, agreeing with S ≥ 100 for PP-UFS reported in Fig. 4a.
Therefore, a larger value of scaling factor is always preferred
so as to minimise the effect of rounding on MRE in larger
number of users.
9.2.2 Computational Cost
We intentionally ignore the cost of Stage 3 in both PP-
UFS and PP-CSS, as the cost-sharing and payment in Stage
3 should be specified by a particular platform for security
consideration, such as blockchain. Therefore, we only focus
on the computational cost in the first two stages, which
is composed of the cost on each user and the cost on the
operator. Here, we set the scaling factor as 100 to ensure
high precision with little effect on the computational time
compared with the number of users. Below, we detail the
incurred computational cost in PP-UFS of Section 5.1.
On the user side, there are two major processing stages:
1) Stage 1: encrypting bji in Stage 1 (1), and decrypting the
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(a) MRE vs. Scaling factor. (b) MRE vs. Number of users.
Fig. 4: MRE with varying scaling factor S and number of users N in PP-UFS and PP-CSS.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: PP-UFS: (a) Average user running time of different
stages. (b) Operator running time vs. number of users.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: PPCSS: (a) Average user running time of different
stages. (b) Operator running time vs. number of users.
received ciphertext in Stage 1 (3); 2) Stage 2: calculating
the ciphertext in Stage 2 (2), and decrypting the received
ciphertext in Stage 2 (4). In this experiment, since users can
run their stages in parallel, we average the total running
time across all users. Fig. 5a illustrates the average running
time of each stage, and the total time of two stages. It shows
that the total running time is no more than 0.05s, which is
well sustainable for the users. All the results in Fig. 5a are
average running time across all timeslots derived from 20
users.
On the operator server, there are also two major pro-
cessing stages: 1) Stage 1: multiplying all the received
ciphertexts in Stage 1 (2); 2) Stage 2: multiplying all the
received ciphertexts in Stage 2 (3), and deriving the aggre-
gate schedule of usage cj in Stage 2 (5). For each timeslot,
we evaluate the running time of each stage, and the total
running time under different number of users ranging from
4 to 20. From Fig. 5b, we can see that Stage 1 dominates the
total running time, because the exponential operation on the
ciphertexts in Stage 1 (2) of Section 5.1 costs the majority of
running time.
Similarly, Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b illustrate the incurred com-
putational cost on the user side and on the operator server
in PP-CSS of Section 5.3. Fig. 6a shows that the total average
user running time is only 0.057s, which is well within the
realm of practicality. Fig. 6b follows the similar trend as
in Fig. 5b, the only difference is that in PP-CSS, Stage 2
dominates the total running time, because the exponential
operation on the ciphertexts in Stage 2 (4) of Section 5.3
occupies the majority of the running time.
However, it should be noted that both the user time
given in Fig. 5a and Fig. 6a, and the operator time given
in Fig. 5b and Fig. 6b are based on a single machine de-
ployed on the user side and the operator server. In practical
scenarios, the operator can deploy as many as machines to
run in parallel to speed up computation, and the number of
machines deployed on the operator should be increased as
per the number of users. The users can use more powerful
multi-core mobiles to improve efficiency of computation.
Therefore, the computational cost is not an obstacle for the
implementation of our protocols.
9.2.3 Communication Cost
For the complexity of communication, we estimate the
communication cost incurred at the first two stages by using
the typical 256-bit key size, where a Paillier ciphertext is
1024 bits (128 bytes) and a value in the plaintext message
space of Paillier is 1024 bits (128 bytes). Therefore, in PP-
UFS as shown in Fig. 2, the total communication cost of the
first two stages between the operator and any user can be
estimated as TN * (1024*4+1024+1024) bits = TN * 0.75 KB,
where TN is the number of timeslots. Similarly, the first two
stages of PP-CFS in Section 5.2 incur the same communi-
cation cost as the first two stages of PP-CFS in Section 5.1.
In comparison, for PP-CSS in Section 5.3, the total commu-
nication cost of the first two stages between the operator
and any user can be estimated as TN * (1024*6+1024) bits =
TN * 0.875 KB. Therefore, the communication costs of our
protocols are all well within the realm of practicality.
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Fig. 7: Average user run-
ning time of PP-UFS using
threshold Paillier.
Fig. 8: Average user run-
ning time of PP-CSS using
threshold Paillier.
9.2.4 Threshold Paillier Cryptosystems
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 illustrate the incurred computational
cost on the user side in PP-UFS and PP-CSS with (N,N/2)-
threshold Paillier, whereN = 20. In comparison with Fig. 5a
and Fig. 6a, it can be observed that threshold Paillier brings
additional computational costs but within an acceptable
level, while greatly enhancing the security of the system.
It should be noted that for N ≤ 3, (N,N)-threshold Paillier
should be used instead for security purpose. We remark that
the incurred computational costs on the operator server are
similar as Fig. 5b and Fig. 6b, as the additional computation
costs are imposed on the user side rather than on the
operator server in threshold Paillier. We also remark that
user running time can be significantly reduced through par-
allel computation with multi-core mobile devices, which we
leave as optimization in future work. Note that in threshold
Paillier, the communication cost during each decryption is
dependent on the number of users t participating in the
partial decryption.
10 CONCLUSION
This paper presents the first work of cloud-based privacy-
preserving protocols for collaborative consumption. We in-
vestigated three real-world problems in collaborative con-
sumption in practical sharing economy applications, in-
cluding uncapacitated facility sharing, capacitated facility
sharing, and communal service sharing. Based on the ho-
momorphic cryptosystems, we propose three novel privacy-
preserving protocols to solve these problems. An extensive
evaluation study is provided and a proof-of-concept cloud-
based system prototype of our protocols is developed. In
future, we will extend our cloud-based privacy-preserving
protocols to other real-world problems, and devise more
robust solutions against malicious users.
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